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THE 1994 MEXICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Introduction 
It is only a few months since the 21 August 1994 election in Mexico, when 
77.7% of those eligible attended the polling stations to vote for who should 
govern their country for the next six years. Electoral results have not yet 
been fully analysed. We are still waiting for full details on voting patterns, 
irregularities and financial balance sheets. Therefore, the following remarks 
should be taken with due reserve. They are intended as preliminary 
impressions of a series of political events that will surely have important 
consequences for the future course of Mexico's political development. 
The paper is organised into four sections. First a general perspective is 
given on the electoral and party systems. Secondly the last period of 
President Salinas's term in office is analysed, and in particular the events of 
1994 that so drastically altered the course and expectations of the election. 
In the third part I turn to the distinctive characteristics of the election. 
Finally, I offer a preliminary analysis of the results and their political 
significance. 
The Electoral System and the Role of Elections 
Traditionally, elections in Mexico have not served the purpose of expressing 
popular preference about candidates, parties and policies. It is something of 
a puzzle, therefore, that elections have been regularly held since 1917 and 
that all presidents1 and literally thousands of candidates have come to occupy 
popularly elected posts through a majority or plurality of votes. However, 
elections have not been superfluous and have served several important 
purposes without which the stability of the system would have been either 
impossible or, at least, more difficult to achieve. 
In the first place, elections have legitimised choices that are made within 
a closed circle (Padgett, 1966), thereby sanctioning the periodical renewal of 
the political elite. Elections have served as a mechanism of elite circulation 
which contributes to discipline, recruitment and the socialisation of new 
participants and the continuous renewal of expectations. But elections have 
also served as a form of plebiscite on the government's legitimacy, and they 
have provided a democratic facade that sets Mexico apart from other 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. In addition, they have 
demonstrated to potential adversaries the government's ability to mobilise 
support and, more recently, they have proved to be a useful way for the 
government to inform itself about trends in popular support by sending 
consent or protest signals to the authorities (Bailey, 1988). 
The different roles assigned to elections within the system were performed 
more or less efficiently for some time. However, a brief review of the 
development of the electoral and party systems from 1946 onwards will 
readily show that both systems had to be periodically adapted to face the 
growing demands of legitimacy, participation and representation.2 Although 
until recently reforms did very little to transform elections into an instrument 
for expressing voters' preferences, they did effectively maintain political 
competition within the bounds set by the system. The 1946 electoral law 
defined the main characteristics of the system that was to rule electoral (and 
party) competition for the decades to come. These included: centralisation of 
political and electoral processes under the executive; self-validation of 
candidates; the absence of reliable appeal procedures; the fusion of party and 
government and indiscriminate transfer of resources from the latter to the 
former; the coexistence of opposition and 'parastatal' parties;3 and the 
systematic manipulation of elections by party and electoral agencies of the 
executive (Molinar 1991, p. 28). Soon after, the hegemonic party system was 
established.4 
The 1946 law placed the whole electoral process under the control of 
federal agencies; local and regional parties were banned; independent 
candidates could no longer run for office. In addition, the emergence and 
development of legal political parties was restricted by an official registry 
which introduced several constraints on eligibility. The 1946 law (and the 
modifications made to it in the following years, 1951 and 1954) undermined 
the possibility of opposition parties attaining substantial shares of power. By 
1943 the official party had already secured an absolute majority (92% of 
votes) in the Chamber of Deputies. 
However, political participation through elections was not eliminated. In 
1946 eleven parties were granted registration and allowed to participate in 
elections. Although this number decreased dramatically in the following 
years,5 participation was still substantial. From 1946 until 1952 the 
electorate was presented with two or more options in most electoral districts 
(Molinar 1991, p. 41) 
Control over the registration of parties allowed the government to regulate 
the number and type of parties admitted in the electoral processes. Since the 
most important electoral challenge came from members of the revolutionary 
coalition who threatened to defect from the official party when it failed to be 
nominated, this authority, together with fraud, proved to be a particularly 
useful instrument in blocking electoral defections. Having eliminated what 
has been termed the 'revolutionary electoral opposition', the only challenge 
that governments had to face came from the extra-revolutionary coalition. 
This was not dangerous, but served the purpose of presenting options and 
maintaining a democratic facade. 
In this period of Mexican history (1940-1960) parties could not effectively 
confront the state. Defections were crushed and extra-revolutionary 
opposition would have to wait many years before it could make headway. 
Only with the growth and greater complexity of society could the extra-
revolutionary opposition advance. 
Political pluralism was excluded through the combination of tight 
legislation, fraud and discipline. These mechanisms proved effective in the 
consolidation of a hegemonic party system, but they gave way to problems 
of representation and credibility. A system that could produce permanent 
majorities of over 90% of members of Congress for the same party over a 
period of some 20 years could not maintain its democratic facade. The need 
to tackle this problem was soon perceived, and reforms followed. This time 
it was electoral rather than party regulations that were reformed. 
No more parties were admitted to the electoral arena,6 but the existing 
ones were promoted through the introduction of a form of proportional 
representation in the chamber of deputies. The main motivation behind this 
1963 electoral reform was to lend some credibility to the electoral process 
and to persuade opposition parties not to engage in behaviour that could 
threaten the system. In the short run the electoral reforms were successful. 
Parties not only abandoned anti-system tactics, but helped to legitimise the 
regime electorally by giving their support to reform and by increasing their 
participation in the political process. 
The reforms also produced other consequences. Parties now had an 
incentive to grow and diversify geographically and their efforts were 
rewarded by an increasing number of seats in the chamber of deputies.7 
However, the advances brought about by more active participation by parties 
and by the increased proportion of votes for opposition parties were soon 
neutralised by an electoral system that over-represented the official party and 
under-represented the opposition (Molinar 1991, p. 83). The development 
and growth of parties therefore led to demands for larger quotas of power. 
These demands were accompanied by a request to reopen the electoral field 
to other forces (especially of the left) that were willing to participate if they 
could be found a place in the party system. 
In fact, the political elite responded relatively quickly to these demands. 
Several factors were responsible. The 1970s opened with a crisis of 
legitimacy caused by the authoritarian response to the student protests of 
1968; economic growth had also slowed; and a series of destabilising 
movements appeared;8 finally, for the first time, the 1976 presidential 
election failed to produce any candidate apart from the PRI contender. 
Political reform took place in 1978, but it fell short of the expectations of 
some political parties. It has nonetheless been regarded as the starting point 
for Mexico's political opening or liberalisation. The many political and 
technical changes that it introduced cannot be reviewed here,9 but it is 
important to note that it tackled one of the most pressing problems, that of 
representation. On the one hand, the new law opened up the 'book of 
registers' to new parties and lowered standards for registration. On the other, 
it made it possible to obtain larger numbers of seats in the lower chamber of 
Congress. However, and this was the main charge against the limited 
character of the reform, it did not reduce the absolute control that the 
executive had over the whole electoral process; this included not only the 
organisational aspects of elections, but also the counting of votes.10 
The 1978 political reform was introduced as a means of expanding and 
stimulating political participation through elections without relinquishing 
governmental control over them, and in that sense it can be counted a 
success.11 The demand for greater representation without loss of control was 
successful.12 However, if we were to judge the results by electoral support 
and legitimacy the reform did not fare so well. The decade that followed was 
full of electoral controversies, charges of abuse, corruption and fraud, and 
it witnessed the electoral decline of the PRI. The original idea of maintaining 
full control of the electoral processes and an absolute hegemony of the 
official party in a land populated by political parties that were seeking and 
winning support proved difficult. 
The legal framework that regulated politico-electoral matters after 1978 
served its purpose but, by increasing participation and competition, it 
fostered further demands that it could not meet. Moreover, the combination 
of a number of factors, ranging from the strengthening of parties, the 
disaffection of growing sectors of the population, and international responses 
to the 1988 presidential elections, posed the most serious threat to the 
survival of the system that had been consolidated in the 1940s. 
Until the 1980s, opposition parties participated in the reproduction of the 
system or, at least, did not pose any serious challenge. But the conditions for 
electoral reproduction of the hegemonic party system were seriously 
undermined during that decade. Such reproduction rested on several 
conditions that by the end of the 1980s were being questioned. 
Control over the electoral process was faltering. Although during the 1980s 
(and until the reforms introduced in May 1994) the government still had a 
firm grip over the institutions in charge of conducting electoral matters and 
it still held enough resources to force its own solutions, the exercise of such 
control and the deployment of such resources were increasingly costly. 
Parties had grown in size and resources - partly as a result of previous 
reforms, partly out of electoral support that was more anti-PRI than pro-
anything - and could afford different strategies with greater chances of 
success. 
Finally, electoral support for the PRI has traditionally come from segments 
of the population associated with low educational levels, agricultural 
occupation and rural dwelling. However, while in 1960 only one fifth of the 
population lived in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants, by 1988 more 
than half of the population did.13 
To all these developments, electorally damaging to the PRI, must be added 
other factors that further contributed to the weakening of the system: lack of 
consensus among the political elite, poor economic performance and an 
international context that not only favoured democracy, but that was also 
characterised by a significant number of regimes undergoing democratic 
transition. 
Electoral processes during the last three years of De La Madrid's term in 
office (1982-88) were questioned in terms of their legitimacy. Victories for 
the opposition were seldom recognised and fraud and other unlawful methods 
were widely used. By 1988 a realignment in the party spectrum had taken 
place. The official party underwent a split in its ranks that proved to be 
irreversible, while the number and type of parties remained roughly the same 
as in 1982 (three to the left of the PRI, two to its right and the three 
traditional parastatal parties). However, the three parastatal parties decided 
not to align themselves with the PRI and, instead, offered their support to the 
defectors from the ruling official party.14 In addition, two of the three left 
parties also supported the presidential candidate, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, who 
emerged from the PRI split. Finally, most parties (right and left) followed a 
common strategy of denouncing unlawful practices, defending the vote and 
threatening civil disobedience. 
It was the electorate that gave the final blow to the hegemonic party 
system, however. After the 1988 presidential and congressional elections it 
was no longer possible to speak of a hegemonic party system, although most 
of the rules that gave birth to it and then permitted its consolidation were still 
in place. The proportion of votes secured by the opposition was large enough 
and sufficiently diversified to break the monopoly held by the hegemonic 
party. 
Although the collapse of the system was avoided and chaos did not follow, 
the consequences of the 1988 election can hardly be overestimated. The 
lessons that opposition leaders and voters drew from the electoral results 
were of the utmost importance. Voters learned that, in spite of fraud, their 
preferences could be made to count and that there were alternatives to the 
established system. In other words, they learned that a vote for the opposition 
might not, after all, be a wasted vote. In truth, opposition parties learned the 
value of building alliances and saw, for the first time, the possibility of 
defeating the ruling party. 
Perhaps more important were the lessons that priistas and government had 
to learn: corporate sectors were no longer reliable as vote deliverers, 
discipline could no longer be sustained with the same methods, the opposition 
could not be articulated at the government's will, leaders and members of the 
opposition would have to be accepted as peers in the political processes, and, 
equally important, being nominated by the PRI did not automatically lead to 
office. 
Two further consequences of the electoral results must be added. On the 
one hand, the ruling party lost the majority needed to alter the Constitution 
and was therefore not only forced to try to keep a tight discipline among its 
own deputies, but also to forge alliances with other parties. On the other, the 
1988 official electoral results15 giving a majority to the PRI presidential 
candidate were questioned by politically-minded citizens and by most 
opposition parties. 
This situation provided the opposition with some advantages that it was 
ready to exploit. Although the Cardenas coalition emerged as the clear second 
electoral force, most gains were in fact for the Partido Action Nacional 
(PAN). This was due to two factors: first, the government made the 
destruction of the Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), formed by 
Cardenas after the 1988 elections, a major political objective; and secondly 
the strategy chosen by the PRD of not recognising the validity of presidential 
elections, denouncing the illegitimacy of Salinas's government and refusing 
to 'cooperate' or even enter into negotiations of any kind with it, did not find 
favour with the electorate. 
In contrast, the strategy pursued by the PAN was based on the acceptance 
of the conclusive fact that Salinas was to be president for the coming term. 
The party knew, however, that its assets had grown and that its collaboration 
was to be invaluable in the legislative arena, as well as being a countervailing 
force to the enormous electoral strength shown in favour of Cardenas. 
The claim is not that the PRD was behaving in a way that damaged the 
reproduction of the system while the PAN worked in the opposite direction. 
In fact, both parties made it difficult for the system to be reproduced along 
the same lines as it had done before. The growth of the electoral support for 
the PAN and the PRD had already undermined the possibility that the 
executive could continue to distribute political rents in the way, to the extent 
and with the degree of certainty that it had done before. Discipline could not 
easily be obtained through this reward system, since the political careers of 
deputies could not be guaranteed in a system that no longer controlled the 
resources. After all, a competitive system offers chances of mobility that are 
not necessarily linked to the governing elite. These new political conditions 
diminished the actual political power of the President. 
Finally, the strengthening of the party system and the electoral gains by the 
opposition complicated the maintenance of legislation that patently favoured 
the official party both in the electoral institutional arrangements and in the 
rules that regulated elections. Reforms that further levelled the electoral 
playing-field were to follow. 
The Recent Context 
Salinas's rise to the presidency in 1988 was the most controversial in the 
whole post-revolutionary period. Not only were the results of the election 
widely questioned, but they were also exceptional by comparison with any 
previous election. Salinas officially received 48.7% of the total of votes 
(50.7% if one does not take into account the annulled votes), the smallest 
percentage a presidential candidate had ever received. He lost the presidential 
race in the capital city as well as in four other states (Estado de Mexico, 
Michoacan, Morelos and Baja California). While in the period from 1946 to 
1985 the government party had lost altogether 72 seats, which represented 
2.6% of the total number of single seat districts in the whole period, in 1988 
Salinas's party lost 66 majority seats, 22% of the single seat districts. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that of the 350 seats (70% of seats in Congress) 
that the majority party could have won, it secured only 260. This meant that 
for the first time the party did not, by itself, have the required majority in 
order to alter the Constitution (Molinar, 1991). 
The newly elected president was therefore obliged to govern not only with 
the smallest electoral majority in Mexican history, but also under the charge 
of having come to power through fraud. But, as mentioned above, collapse 
of the system did not ensue. In spite of this initial weakness Salinas proved 
to be one of the most powerful presidents and he was able to push forward his 
project of state reform with little hindrance. 
Although a substantial political reform was expected, what in fact occurred 
was a great leap in the economic restructuring of the country and a 
strengthening of presidentialism. This is not the place to review Salinas's 
performance, but it is noteworthy that in the 1991 mid-term elections the PRI 
captured 320 of the 500 seats in a contest in which voter turnout increased to 
65.3% as against 50% in the 1988 election. In fact, the PRI won 61 % of the 
vote nationwide and surveys reported that over 60% of the population 
approved of Salinas's performance. Somehow the Mexican elite had managed 
a radical transformation of the economy, albeit with very high social costs, 
while simultaneously maintaining political stability and retaining the basic 
authoritarian traits of the political system. 
Although it is true that economic reform was given priority, some progress 
was still achieved in the political field. Before 1994, two electoral reforms 
were implemented. The legislation passed in July 1990 created the semi-
autonomous Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) as well as the Federal Electoral 
Tribunal with 17 magistrates to deal with electoral complaints. Several 
provisions to reduce the chances of fraud were introduced (e.g. voter 
registration cards with photographs, new protection for assuring secret 
balloting, new lists of registered voters). In 1993 the governability clause, 
whereby the party obtaining 35% of the national vote in deputy elections 
gained a majority in the chamber of deputies, was eliminated. A new rule was 
introduced disallowing any one party from obtaining more than 315 seats in 
that chamber, rendering it impossible for any party to amend the Constitution 
without engaging in coalition building (the majority needed is 325 deputies). 
Additionally, the number of Senate seats per state increased from two to four, 
making it easier for one of them to be won by the runner-up party. In this 
manner the opposition was assured of 25 % of seats (32 out of 128). Spending 
limits, as well as mechanisms to monitor compliance, were set up. A mild 
reform to the media completed the reforms of 1990 to 1993. 
Notwithstanding the importance of these reforms, they did not appear as 
a sufficient guarantee of a cleaner and fairer electoral competition. They also 
suffered from a lack of legitimacy, since they were passed without the vote 
of the PRD. But the real problem regarding elections was linked to the 
increasing reliance on extra-legal solutions. Electoral legality and legitimacy 
during Salinas's term were badly damaged by the way his administration 
handled contested elections and post-electoral challenges. There were indeed 
some improvements in the way elections were conducted, and opposition 
victories were occasionally recognised. However, in cases where an apparent 
PRI victory was followed by widespread allegations of fraud and protest, 
PRI candidates were replaced by interim or provisional governors after 
closed-door negotiations between the executive and opposition party leaders. 
Apart from the expected frustration these negotiations caused among local 
PRI representatives, they no doubt contributed to the lack of confidence in 
elections as a means of expressing voters' preferences and attaining office. 
The lesson to be learnt was that elections need not be won, but instead could 
be negotiated with the executive. It was in this context that the three major 
parties selected their candidates to run for the presidency in 1994 and 
designed their campaigns. 
The 1994 elections were dominated by three main threats, by great efforts 
to increase the credibility of elections and at the same time by a widespread 
disbelief in the fairness of the process. The first threat concerned the 
possibility of violence arising from a sequence of events starting with the 
Chiapas uprising in January 1994 and the assassination in March of the PRI's 
first presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the kidnappings of 
businessmen, the increase in drug-traffic activities, and the perception of 
greater public insecurity. The second threat came from within the PRI, where 
fears of a new schism were generated by what was judged an ambivalent 
position in Salinas's backing of Colosio and, later on, by the process that led 
to the nomination of Ernesto Zedillo as the PRI presidential candidate. The 
third threat arose from the possibility that the PRD might withdraw its 
support from the negotiating efforts and even make an alliance with the 
Zapatista movement. In the end none of these threats materialised, but they 
all served to provide impetus to a political reform that has been judged by 
most analysts as the most important since 1978. 
On 1 January 1994 the political prospects were totally altered by the 
Chiapas uprising. Neither parties nor government were sure of the extent of 
this threat nor of the likely development of the conflict. However, it soon 
became clear that it had a direct and beneficial effect on the development of 
the electoral process. On 27 January all parties except the Partido Popular 
Socialista (PPS) signed an agreement that led to an important set of reforms. 
Apart from its content, the relevance of the 1994 reforms springs from the 
fact that they were initially set out by the opposition parties and were the first 
to receive the backing of all three major parties. 
Regarding the reforms, the composition of the IFE's General Council - the 
supreme decision-making body - was changed to give control to citizen 
councillors without party affiliation. With the new composition, the General 
Council has 11 voting members: the chairman (who is the Minister of the 
Interior), six citizens nominated by political parties and approved by a two-
thirds vote of the chamber of deputies, and two members each from the 
senate and the house of representatives (one for the majority party and the 
other from the first minority party). Thus, for the first time the supreme 
electoral body is not controlled either by the majority party or the 
government. The same scheme was to be reproduced for the state and district 
levels (IFE's 32 state councils and 300 district councils) where out of seven 
votes six belong to citizens with no party affiliation. 
Some other measures were introduced to ensure fair competition: 
acceptance of domestic and international observers; the establishment of an 
electoral prosecutor's office; modification of the criminal code to specify 
electoral crimes; external audit of the voter registry; increase in the official 
television and radio time; the end of self-validation of elections; televised 
debates; precinct level officials chosen by random lottery; numbered ballots 
and the commitment to hand in preliminary results on the night of the 
election. 
The importance of these reforms and the process of negotiation between 
government and the major parties cannot be overemphasised. Nonetheless 
serious doubts about the free and clean character of the elections remained. 
As late as June 1994 half of the population did not believe that the elections 
would be fair. The explanation for such disbelief probably lies in 65 years of 
fraud and unlawful practices, of broken promises and permanent 
arbitrariness. 
The 1994 Elections 
The election of 21 August 1994 was unique by whatever standards we want 
to judge it. Many untried rules and practices were adopted and so many 
extraordinary events surrounded this election that no one was sure what to 
expect. Also, apart from the context in which they took place, several other 
issues contribute to the uniqueness of the 1994 elections. 
On the procedural side the following deserve mention: 
- the high degree of competitiveness 
- the changing of electoral rules in the middle of the campaign 
- the largest voter registration 
- the most closely monitored elections 
- the largest number of election officials 
- the greatest media coverage 
- the first to have foreign observers.16 
Another exceptional feature was the expectations it generated, in terms of 
what direct participants and society at large believed to be at stake. For 
many, the fate of the country was to be decided on 21 August. The elections 
would be the proof of whether Mexico could advance peacefully to a genuine 
democratic outcome. They would also serve to assess the extent to which the 
polity had become institutionalised. Despite the fact that nearly half of the 
population had doubts about the clean character of the election, there was a 
sense that an alternation in power could be brought about through the 
expression of preferences in the ballot box. This belief was shared by the 
three major political parties and society at large. However, paradoxically, the 
credibility issue was the one that dominated the electoral process. 
To the extent that all political parties and their candidates decided to work 
within the legal framework that the government and they had set up, the 
legitimacy of the process was secured. But at the same time, two of the three 
major parties did not believe that such a framework could guarantee a fair 
election and this situation undermined the credibility of the elections. 
With regard to the presidential electoral campaigns, these were not unusual 
in their methods if we compare them with previous ones - except for a much 
publicised television debate among the three main candidates.17 Novelties 
could be found elsewhere, however. Public discussion was centred far more 
on the way elections were to be conducted than on policy proposals, which 
played a subordinate role in public discussion. This could be explained by the 
fact that what was at stake was not who would govern. The issue in this 
election was much more how to attain power than how to exercise it or what 
to do with it. 
Another novelty of the 1994 election was the polls. Public discussion gave 
an unusual attention to opinion polls, and yet there was a tendency to 
disbelieve their results. From June, and until the last polls of August, a clear 
first place was given to the PRI candidate and, apart from MORI's results, 
all of them were consistent in giving the PRI between 41 and 52%, the PAN 
between 18 and 29% and the PRD between 8% and 11%. In these polls the 
percentage of people that did not declare their preferences, or expressed 
indecision, ranged between 18 and 25%. (See Table 1.) 
Nevertheless, as has already been mentioned, polls tended to be disbelieved 
by parties and public opinion in general. On the one hand, it was argued that 
people lied about their preferences, especially those inclined towards the 
opposition. On the other, it was believed that all those who manifested 
indecision were going to vote for one of the opposition parties. Finally, it was 
held that reduced abstentionism was going to damage the vote for the PRI. 
Enthusiasm for polls gave way to another novelty in the 1994 election, that 
of sketching possible scenarios for different electoral results. But this leads 
us to what, in my opinion, really constituted the exceptional character of the 
1994 election. What made this election different - even before it took place 
- was the uncertainty it generated. Uncertainty in this case was not so much 
about the results, but rather about whether all participants would agree to 
play right to the end within the framework that had been designed and, as the 
election day approached, about whether the major participants - including the 
government - would accept the results of the election. 
Table 1 
OPINION POLLS 
Voting Preference % 
(June, July, August 1994) 
Name of Poll PRI PAN PRD OTHERS Undecided 
JUNE 
Covarrubias 41 21 8 2 28 
Reforma 41 29 9 3 18 
GEOP 44 24 11 7 14 
EPI 52 29 8 3 8 
JULY 
Covarrubias 47 17 8 3 25 
Reforma 46 18 9 2 25 
Belden 46 19 9 8 18 
AUGUST 
MORI 38 22 11 5 24 
IndermecHarris 44 19 11 4 22 
GEOP 42 24 11 5 19 
Regarding the first element of uncertainty, there was a constant fear that 
one of the major parties would defect. The second aspect of uncertainty grew 
in importance as the election approached and gave way to the analysis of 
different scenarios based on the expected behaviour of parties in relation to 
alternative results. 
The uncertainty that characterised the election is, I believe, very revealing 
about how much Mexico has advanced along the road to democracy. This 
conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that, while in established 
democracies the electoral issues centre around the alternative offers that 
parties have to make, in the Mexican case this was not a very significant issue 
in spite of the fact that each of the three major parties are supposed to hold 
different views on the way the country should be governed. The parties and 
public opinion were both far more worried about the procedural aspects of 
the election than about the policy offers that the citizens were receiving. In 
the same manner, citizens were far more interested in stability than in what 
candidates were offering by way of policy proposals. 
Table 2 
EXIT POLLS AND QUICK-COUNTING 
% of votes 
Name of Poll PRI PAN PRD OTHERS 
ALIANZA CIVICA 47.8 27.7 15.2 3.3 
COPARMEX 49.1 27.9 13.7 5.5 
CNIRT 50.0 27.0 16.0 1.5 
CNAOE 50.4 26.6 17.6 -
CDSE 50.3 26.6 17.1 6.0 
ONOEM 50.2 26.8 17.0 6.0 
REFORMA 49.7 29.7 14.7 5.9 
Election day, 21 August, came as a surprise for two main reasons: its 
peaceful character and the great number of voters who turned out. Results 
from authorised quick-counting methods or exit polls (see Table 2) - came 
three hours after polling stations were closed and gave a clear victory to 
Zedillo with around 50% of votes. 
As had been previously agreed, the IFE released results of the presidential 
race when 15 % of the voting had been counted. This gave the result as 47.1 % 
for the PRI, 31.3% for the PAN and 15.5% for the PRD. 
Figure 1 
IFE's Counting of Presidential Votes (28 August 1994) 
Thereafter results did not change substantially. The final results, given seven 
days after the election were (see Figure 1): 
PRI 48.7% with 17,336,325 votes 
PAN 25.9% with 9,222,899 votes 
PRD 16.6% with 5,901,557 votes 
The total number of votes cast was 35,550,283, amounting to 77.74% of 
voter turnout, the highest in Mexico's history (Figure 2). Apart from these 
general results, the following figures are worth highlighting: the PRI won 
every state including the capital city; while the national average for Zedillo 
was 48.7%, his vote in predominantly rural districts was 60%; a greater 
proportion of young people (54%) than of adults (38%) voted PRI; Zedillo 
received 7 million more votes than Salinas did in 1988; Diego Fernandez de 
Cevallos, the PAN candidate, received 5.5 million more votes than his 
counterpart in 1988; the PAN was unable to win in the states under its 
control;18 and the PRD was unable to retain its majority in any of the states 
it won in 1988.19 
Figure 2 
Electoral Turnout, 1934-1994 
For Congressional elections the figures are given in Table 3. Although the 
results of pre-electoral polls came blose to actual voting figures, these 
nevertheless came as a surprise. I have already mentioned the two main 
reasons underlying widespread disbelief in the polls. Both the PAN and the 
PRD thought that they were going to fare better in Congressional elections 
because of the expectation of cross-voting or split tickets: that is, there was 
an expectation that people would vote PRI for president, but they would 
balance this by voting for opposition parties in Congress. This did not 
happen. 
Table 3 
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 1994 ELECTION 
SEATS TOTAL MAJORITY PROPORTIONAL" % 
PRI 300 277 23 60 
PAN 119 18 101 23.8 
PRD 71 5 66 14.2 
P T a 10 - 10 2.0 
TOTAL 500 300 200 100.0 
a Partido de Trabajadores 
b 40% of seats are allocated according to a system of proportional representation: the rest are 
allocated on the basis of the candidate with the largest number of votes. 
SENATE 1994 ELECTION 
PARTY SEATS % 
PRI 64 66.6 
PAN 24 25.1 
PRD 8 8.3 
TOTAL 96 100.0 
The 21 August election was not exemplary if the whole process is judged 
by international standards. However, significant fraud has been discounted; 
that is, fraud that would substantially alter the results. Even in the very 
unlikely case, for example, that the PRD was right and there were 8 million 
voters missing from the voting lists and all of them voted for Cardenas, 
Zedillo would still have won. 
Fraud discounted, the only valid criticism we are left with is that the 
elections were not fair for one single, true and powerful reason: the 
symbiotic relation between the PRI and government precludes the possibility 
of fair elections and seriously reduces the opportunity for opposition parties 
to win. If the election was clean in the sense that electoral authorities were 
neutral and votes were duly counted, the conditions of the competition were 
not fair. Structural fraud persisted. 
The two main opposition parties accepted their defeat and the majority of 
the population seems to be convinced that the elections were clean. Post-
election polls revealed that only 24 % of the population did not believe the 
elections were clean as against 61% that did and 15% that did not have an 
opinion. The claim that post-electoral behaviour would be destabilising 
proved false. All parties agreed to play within the rules and it was within this 
agreed framework that the opposition was defeated. The electoral results 
were not as close as some expected. Zedillo clearly won in the polling 
booths. 
There must be an explanation for this, and different types of argument can 
be brought into the analysis. The first is that Zedillo won because of the 
unequal conditions. These are manifest in very many ways, from economic 
resources to coverage in the media. However, they all tend to recognise one 
single source: the close relation between the PRI and government. This leads 
to what has been called the vicious circle of Mexican politics: there seems to 
be no way of separating PRI and government while the PRI keeps winning; 
and the chances of the PRI being defeated seem low as long as the PRI 
maintains its marriage to government (Castaneda, 1994). There is, however, 
one flaw in this argument. Conditions for electoral competition in 1988 were 
far more adverse than they are today and yet the left opposition came close 
to winning that year. 
This leads us to the second type of argument. Why did the PAN and the 
PRD fail to attract more voters? They both made miscalculated assumptions 
about the degree of discontent that would be prevalent among the population 
after a costly restructuring economic programme, after years of abuse and 
corruption, after arbitrary decisions, after living with an unlawful state. Yet 
perceptions, or perhaps their translation into political behaviour, were simply 
wrong. 
The PAN in fact exceeded what most analysts had hitherto considered the 
limit of possible votes that a conservative party in Mexico could secure. An 
analysis of PAN votes shows that this party draws most of its votes from 
urban, prosperous and educated voters. The PAN could not (maybe it did not 
even try to) penetrate other segments of the population, notably in rural 
areas. Must we then wait until Mexico becomes more modernised, rich and 
educated to see a PAN victory? 
The supposed failure of the PRD - it did, actually, double its percentage 
of votes in comparison to 1991 - can be analysed in a much more 
straightforward way: Cardenas, the PRD presidential candidate, had much 
too radical a discourse. In a context dominated by the fear of violence and 
instability, Cardenas and his party did not manage sufficiently to separate 
themselves from non-electoral alternatives. This failure can be attributed as 
much to themselves as to the rebels in Chiapas, who openly adopted Cardenas 
as their candidate, and to the official party who fuelled this identification. 
Apart from the unfairness of the game and the mistakes made by the 
opposition parties themselves, there is also the argument that what we 
witnessed was not a massive vote in favour of the PRI and Zedillo but rather 
a vote of fear. Chiapas and the ensuing violence seems to have favoured a 
continuist option granting more votes to the PRI than it would have received 
in peaceful times. As the PAN's president said recently: it was the 
government's failure that generated the Chiapas insurrection, yet that same 
government was the one to sow the seeds of fear. It is now impossible to 
judge what would have happened had violence not appeared on the horizon. 
The probability is that the PRI's electoral support would have been smaller. 
For years the disappearance of the PRI has been predicted with informed 
opinion insisting that, if a choice was given to the population, it would 
immediately oust the ruling party. Mexicans remained convinced that their 
increasingly modern society was no longer prepared to put up with what the 
government delivered. Recently it has been argued that the PRI's chances had 
been significantly damaged after the government's policies had inflicted such 
high social costs on the majority of the population. Furthermore, a detailed 
analysis of the internal problems that the PRI was undergoing seemed to 
indicate that its chances of achieving a clear-cut victory were seriously 
reduced. In this view the PRI was so badly hit by Salinas's political style that 
it was unlikely it could respond to the great electoral challenge it was facing. 
After all, it has always been said that the PRI is not a party designed to win 
under competitive conditions (Aguilar Camin, 1994). 
According to one exit poll, voters chose the PRI for two main reasons: fear 
of the unknown and tradition (because they had always voted PRI). They both 
boil down to the same motivation: the PRI has guaranteed stability for over 
70 years, what else should we ask for? Why push our luck? Isn't it rational 
to stick to those that have governed us instead of turning to inexperienced 
politicians to run our public affairs? What Mexicans may need to learn is that 
it is far easier to introduce changes in formal institutions than to transform 
embedded habits and routines. Power breeds power. 
No matter what argument we use to explain the PRI's victory, the fact 
remains that this party is the option chosen by more than 17 million voters, 
half of the population that decided to express their preferences on 21 August 
1994. But it is also true that the other half of the electorate voted against the 
PRI or in favour of the other two main options. The election results might not 
have been what non-priistas desired, but neither were they disastrous to the 
opposition, as some priistas might have wished. 
What can we then make of the electoral results and what are the probable 
consequences? The figures can be considered in different ways. On the side 
of the PRI we could say that, given the conditions, it did very well. But we 
could also argue that it merely maintained its share of the vote in comparison 
to 1988 - or even saw it reduced by a significant 13%, if our benchmark is 
1991. In contrast, the PAN almost doubled its vote and in absolute terms 
received as many votes as Salinas did in 1988. The PRD's numbers dropped, 
compared to 1988, but it doubled its percentage of votes compared to 1991 
(Figures 3 and 4). 
Figure 3 
Presidency: Comparative Electoral Results 1988-1994 
Figure 4 
Comparative Electoral Results 1988-1994 Chamber of Deputies (% seats) 
a The name 'PRD' is used in 1988 for purposes of comparison, although it had not yet been formally 
created as a party. 
The uniqueness of the 21 August election vanishes when we consider the 
results other than in terms of voter turnout. In fact, these results bear more 
resemblance to the pre-1988 situation: the PRI won every single state in the 
country; of majority senate seats all 64 are for the PRI; out of 300 majority 
deputy seats 277 are for the PRI; out of 40 majority asambleistas 38 are for 
the PRI. In sum, out of the 404 electoral posts to be decided by the first past 
the post system, 379, or 93.5%, went to the PRI. The remaining 6.5% is 
divided between the PAN and the PRD. Without the proportional 
representation portion of the mixed electoral system (Hinojosa, 1994), party 
representation would be grossly distorted. The picture is similar if we add the 
PRI's near monopoly in terms of governors, local authorities and state 
legislatures. 
In spite of changes in the ways elections are conducted, the structure of 
power remained more or less the same as it always was. With an almost 
identical percentage of voting between PRI and opposition in 1988 and 1994, 
the opposition won far fewer seats in the last election. In fact the PRI fell 
short by only 15 seats of the maximum number of seats allowed for a party. 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to draw clear conclusions at such a short distance from the 
elections and the following are intended only as preliminary thoughts about 
the possible consequences of the 1994 contest. Elections cannot be judged in 
themselves, but in relation to the aims being pursued. An assessment of the 
situation requires making clear the end to which we think elections should 
contribute. Two parameters can be put forward: stability and governability 
on the one side, and on the other, democracy. 
In terms of democracy, advances can undoubtedly be identified. For a 
start, participants were able to organise a framework within which all players 
agreed to play. Moreover, they did so in very adverse conditions. Secondly, 
the framework was definitely more democratic than any of its predecessors, 
allowing a more even-handed game. Thirdly, the results have been 
respected.20 Thus, Mexico has advanced in three of the conditions that 
determine a successful transition: agreement of new rules, playing under 
them and accepting the outcomes. However, we are still far from a fair 
contest. It is obvious that the competition did not take place among several 
parties, but among a number of parties and a party supported by the 
government (Castaneda, 1994) - a government that was ready to furnish it 
with enormous public resources. 
A number of questions arise at this point: what does it take to make fair 
elections? Was it worth betting everything on a more equitable set of rules? 
Are rules as important as we think in order to secure a positive result? What 
would be required in order to force a separation between party and 
government? Here the prospects have been less favourable since the chances 
of separating the PRI from government are greatly reduced in view of the 
election results, as are those of having a Congress strong enough to check the 
power of the executive. Similarly, advances towards a reasonable degree of 
federalism are less likely. All these are as important as procedural rules in 
the advancement of democracy. 
Finally, there is the issue of governability and stability. This question can 
be tackled from two different perspectives. On the one hand, there is the 
perception that the PRI had a greater chance than the other parties of 
maintaining both stability and governability. This view says that Mexico is 
not yet ready for alternation of power at the national level and that we should 
continue to advance in gaining governing experience at state and local levels. 
The second perspective is that the results of the election can lead to instability 
for the reason that once again they show that there is no way of changing the 
structure of power through peaceful means. In this perspective an important 
consequence of the electoral results is that they could discourage political 
actors from continuing their participation within the institutional framework. 
Has Mexico crossed the threshold of democracy? My guess is that it has 
not done so yet. This is for a single reason. Apart from the undoubted 
importance of rules, crossing the threshold of democracy implies checks and 
balances on political power. Up to now Mexico has focused the struggle for 
democracy on the ways and means of attaining power; the second step is that 
of checking, of assuring the responsible exercise of political power regardless 
of who has been favoured by the voters' preference. The conditions for the 
continued rule of an unbound presidentialism are still present. 
However, pessimism should not necessarily prevail. The traditional 
contempt for democratic procedures and democratic values is withering 
away. The scorn for the Mexican public (the citizenry), the disdain for 
Congress and the disregard for legality are attitudes and forms of behaviour 
that cannot be sustained for much longer. The conditions that fostered them 
are not with us any more. Democracy seems a likely eventual outcome. 
Notes 
1. Two elections - that of 1940 and that of 1988 - have been so severely 
questioned that doubts remain about whether the official candidates did in fact 
win the presidential race. In the case of Carlos Salinas in 1988 the impression 
is that he did win, although not with the percentage of votes attributed to him 
by the electoral authorities. 
2. In this section I borrow extensively from Molinar (1991). 
3. Parastatal parties are parties supported by the state for their role both in 
maintaining the credibility of plurality and competition, but also in fragmenting 
the party system. They normally back the official presidential candidate as well 
as his agenda and it is reasonable to believe that without state support they 
would have little chance of surviving. 
4. This has been considered a mixed or hybrid form between single and 
dominant party systems. Hegemonic parties differ from state parties in that they 
share the political arena with other legally admitted parties; however, like state 
parties, they were created not to compete but to govern and, by virtue of their 
relation to the state, they can guarantee the vast majority of electoral posts 
(Sartori, 1980 and Crespo, 1994, pp. 51 and 58). On the other hand, they differ 
from dominant party systems: in these, competitive elections are the rule, 
alternation of power is not ruled out, electoral laws, processes and results are 
regularly accepted by most if not all political actors, and the proportion of votes 
is never as overwhelming as those present in the former (Pempel, 1991 and 
Crespo 1994, pp. 52-4). 
5. Three parties in 1949, five in 1952, four in 1955 and 1958 and five in 1961. 
6. By 1964 the party system consisted of four parties (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), Partido de Action Nacional (PAN), Partido Popular 
Socialista (PPS) and Partido Autentico de la Revolution Mexicana (PARM)) and 
no more registrations were to be allowed until the late 1970s. 
7. To illustrate this point it is interesting to note that the principal opposition 
party (PAN) managed to secure 20 seats in Congress in 1964 while the sum of 
all seats for PAN in the previous four elections was 22 (Molinar, 1991, p. 66). 
8. These included the formation of guerrilla movements, strong and widespread 
labour dissent, peasant revolts and business community threats. 
9. The political reform has been a widely studied phenomenon. Good general 
accounts can be found in Rodriguez Araujo (1980), Gonzalez Casanova (1981 
and 1985), Molinar (1991) and Craske (1994). 
10. Opposition parties viewed the political reform as limited in at least the 
following respects: no mechanisms against fraud were included, electoral 
institutions remained centralised and dominated by the executive, and it did not 
allow for independent candidates or regional parties. 
11. Three figures can serve to illustrate that representation and participation 
expanded greatly as a result of the reform. The average number of parties 
jumped from four in the 1964-76 period to 8.3 in the 1979-85 period. The 
average number of candidates presented per electoral district increased from 3.6 
to 7.8 for the same periods. While the 1976 presidential election had only one 
candidate, the 1982 election had seven (Molinar 1991, p. 101). 
12. It must be noted that increased participation by opposition parties did not 
come at the expense of members of the PRI, for the number of seats in 
Congress was augmented by 100. The same expedient was to be used in 1986 
when another 100 seats were added. 
13. The rural-urban division and the association of rural electoral support for 
the PRI is analysed in Molinar (1991, pp. 144-5 and 168-70). Electoral support 
for the PRI in rural districts was 82% on average in the 1979-1985 period. 
14. It is interesting to note that from 1946 up to 1982 all PRI presidential 
candidates had been backed by at least one of the so-called parastatal parties. 
15. There are two different official figures for presidential votes: 50.74% and 
48.74%. The first one is calculated after the deduction of annulled votes and 
those received for unregistered candidates (over 700,000 votes). The second one 
includes all votes that were officially counted. 
16. A good account of the peculiarities of the 1994 election can be found in 
Grayson (1994). See also Serrano and Harvey (1994). 
17. This debate took place on 12 May. Public opinion polls established that the 
winner in the debate was Diego Fernandez de Cevallo, candidate of the PAN, 
with Cuahtemoc Cardenas, candidate of the PRD, coming last. 
18. During the Salinas administration the PAN won the elections for governor 
in Baja California and Chihuahua and, through, 'concertacion', the govenorship 
of Guanajuato. 
19. According to the official results, during the 1988 Presidential election the 
FDN (Frente Democratico Nacional) won in Mexico City and the states of Baja 
California, Mexico, Michoacan and Morelos. Although the FDN had replaced 
the PAN as the second electoral force in several states, by 1989 the newly 
created PRD managed to maintain second place position in only four of the 
eight states where elections were held. A similar pattern became evident during 
the 1991 mid-term federal elections. 
20. The main exception is Chiapas, where the PRD has refused to recognise the 
victory of the PRI in the elections for governor. 
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